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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State
University, in the words of its constitution, is:
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two
annual faculty ~esearch lectures in the fields of ( 1) the biological
and exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2) the
humanities and social sciences, including education and business
administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in
the Humanities.
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures.
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution:
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2)
publication of research through recognized channels in the field
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an extended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing the
character of the students.
T. Y. Booth was selected by the committee to deliver the Annual
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members
of the Association we are happy to present Professor Booth's paper:
The Supreme Organ of the Mind's Self-Ordering Growth

Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture

The Supreme Organ of the
Mind's Self-Ordering
Growth
T. Y. Booth

An English teacher complained not long ago in one of the official
journals of the National Council of Teachers of English, College
English, that " ... the NCTE, like the Dartmouth Conference, proceeds as if 1. A. Richards had never existed .... '" Since this article
says very well a good many things that many of us in English think
need saying these days, and since Richards thinks about the problems
of creating and interpreting language perhaps as deeply as anyone in
our time, it occurred to me that I could perhaps do no better for this
lecture than to proceed as if 1. A. Richards indeed does exist, and
try to explain a little of why I think it is important for everyone,
starting but by no means ending with teachers of English, to be able
to look at matters from the viewpoints which he provides. We need
to bear in mind continually the frightful complexities of any language
situation, however much we may think to focus or simplify or adapt
a given bit of language to our particular abilities and desires, or to
the abilities, desires, and needs of our students or other clientele.
lAnn E. Berthoff, " From Problem-Solving to a Theory of I magination," p.
641n.

Richards believes that in one particular complication of language in
action, the adequate translating from one language to another not
historically or culturally related, from Chinese to English, for example,
"We have ... what may very probably be the most complex type of
event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos."2 And this particular assertion can be taken as merely giving emphasis to the sufficiently complex process of comprehending a statement in one's own
language. As Richards himself goes on to say:
"Translation theory
has
a peculiar duty
toward man's self-completion.
[It] has not only to work
for better mutual comprehension between users of diverse tongues ;
more central still in its purposing is a more complete viewing of
itself and of the Comprehending which it should serve."3

Now this lecture finally will attempt to focus so much on a
particular cluster of language considerations, and will insist so definitelyon their importance, that it may be well first to acknowledge at
least a few of the many other also important aspects of life and of
language that it will not deal with.
I believe, for example, that significant physical and mental experiences do take place apart from language. To insist on the importance of language is not to deny the importance of other experiences.
I also recognize that significant language situations occur that
have little or no concern with "taking" thought, little concern with
what might be called thought in an overt sense-"phatic communion," it has been called: many of our routine social signals and
responses, some rituals, and the like. 4
I believe, as a final example of what I shall not talk about,
that language can be profitably studied as a separable thing in itself,
2Speculative Instruments, p. 22.
3Ibid. , p. 38.
4C. K. Ogden and Richards : "In 'good morning' and 'good-bye' the referential fun ction lapses, i.e., these verbal signs are not symbols, it is enough if they
are suitable. Exclamations and oaths similarly are not symbols; they have only
to satisfy the condition of appropriateness. . . ." Th e Meaning of M eaning,
p. 234. See also S. I. Hayakawa's Language in Thought and Action, especially
chapter 6, "The Language of Social Cohension."
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its patterns identified, its workings analyzed, its operations described.
We ask our English majors to do a fair bit of such study.
What I will attempt finally to deal with in what follows, however,
is our developed language as something not separable from us,
something that is essentially of us, us as identifiably human beings.
Nearly all of the most significant thought, nearly all of our development that is most distinctly and distinctively human, takes place
in, by, with, through, language. It is not merely that the development
could not take place without language- for that again seems to
identify language as something separable. It is that a person's development in language is his development, not separable, finally, from
him. Language, as Richards puts it, is not "a code . .. it is an organthe supreme organ of the mind's self-ordering growth . ... language
is an instrument for controlling our becoming."5
As is true of other organs, when language is functioning well,
we pay little or no attention to it or its complexities. Part of the
difficulty, in fact, of doing justice to the problems of expression and
interpretation that Richards asks us to deal with is that routine
language experience occurs so effortlessly, so unconcernedly, so
second-natured naturally, that when we do run into difficulties we
do not always recognize them as difficulties of our developing language.
Or, what can be even worse, we think of the language difficulties
as if they were separable, as if the thought would be available if only
we could get at it without having to use language, "as though co mposing were a sort of catching a nonverbal butterfly in a verbal
butterfly net, as though comprehending were a releasing of the said
butterfly from the net .... "6
May I therefore ask you to do some very difficult work as you
participate with me in this lecture, work comparable to making
your heart skip a beat by thinking about its doing so, work comparable to improving your basal metabolism by paying some attention to it.7
5Speculative Instruments, p. 9.
6Richards, So Much Nearer, p. 175, and see pp. 28-29, below.
7See Richards, Interpretation in T eaching, p. 288.
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First, let us examine Richards' theoretical analysis of what
goes on in language situations. 8
He begins with what help he can get from the communications
engineer, and observes that for communication to occur, there must
be a source which selects, encodes, and transmits, and a destination
which receives, decodes, and develops. 0
The fact that the process can be talked of in such terms is no
doubt the reason for so many attempts to deal with language as if it
were only a code. Unique complexities develop, however, because
these processes are not just matters of retrieving one meaningequivalent for each word, or one pattern of meaning for each pattern
of wording. Every creating and every interpreting of a language
utterance is influenced or determined by "any number of partially
similar situations in which partially similar utterances have occurred,"
and
the comprehending is a function of the comparison fields from
which it derives. Let the units of which these comparison fields
consist be utterances-within-situations-the utterance and its
situation being partners in the network of transactions with other
utterances in other situations which lends significance to the
utterance. Partially similar utterances made within very different
situations are likely to require different comprehendings.
10

Richards suggests that the total processes of dealing with these
innumerable influences plus carrying out the immediate intentions
of the source or the destination involve at least seven ((sorts of work"
all operating more or less continuously and all mutually influencing
each other as they simultaneously occur. He offers the following
scheme of what is likely to be going on in any uttering or comprehending beyond the simplest.
SAgain, in the particular discussion I cite most, he is talking specifically
about translation theory, but what he says clearly fits situations in which
people are using the same language, and he uses much the same ideas in
talking about these situations.
nspeculative Instruments, p. 22 . See also So Much Nearer, pp. 156ff.,
185ff.
10Richards, Sp eculative Instrum ents, p. 23.
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1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

Indicates: points to, selects. . . .
Characterizes: says something about, sorts.
Realizes: comes alive to, wakes up to, presents.
Values: cares about . . . .
Influences: would change or keep as it is. .
Controls: manages, directs, runs, administers itself.
Purposes: seeks, pursues, tries, endeavors to he or to
do. . . ."

These, mark you again, are all operating more or less continuously, and are all mutually influencing each other as they simultaneously occur. Clearly if there is complexity of the degree suggested
by such a scheme, we are not dealing with any direct, one-to-one
encoding-decoding process.
These "sorts of work" are clear-cut enough, will all bear thinking about, and are not offered by Richards as necessarily designating
llAdaptcd from S/Jecuiative Instruments, p. 26.
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all that goes on, or as all going on inevitably, in every language
situation."~ But that at least these complexities are likely to develop
I commend for your consideration.
For this lecture, however, having called them to your attention,
I would like to focus not on the sorts of work being done but on
some aspects of the processes themselves, the processes of creating
and interpreting the utterances that do these sorts of work. And the
first aspect I would ask you to deal with is the matter of interpreting the "partially similar utterances" in "partially similar situations," the comprehending of which is "a function of the comparison
fields from which it derives." Let us start with what I hope will
seem clear-cut examples, to see if we can catch some language in
action, to watch how it behaves, rather than either analyzing it part
hy part, as if it were a model or a dead specimen, or simply letting
it do its work, as we are accustomed to doing, and as we should do
much of the time, in routine situations, without trying to see how it
does it.
Let us start by looking at one or two samples of a type often
used in Freshman English classes, or in beginning linguistics classes.
What I am asking you to do is to see if you can tell what goes on.
It is not that there is any difficulty of interpretation here. The interesting question is, why do we find no difficulty in interpretation?
Language functions with human beings. I am asking you to ask
yourselves, what happens within or to you as you comprehend?
First, then, examples of a couple of ordinary words requiring
completely different comprehendings because they are utterances
within different situations.
The report gave full statistics and discussed the implications of the
dead game count in Utah for 1972.
Let me tell you the inspiring story of an injured but dead game
athlete.
l ~"There is swearing," he notes, "and there is mathematics." He also
explains why he did not add "venting"-releasing emotions or tensions in some
sense- after it was suggested to him, though it clearly is important in most
language situations, perhaps in a sense in all, or nearly all.
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Now, you have no difficulty comprehending the sense of "dead
game" in either sentence. You do not have to think about why you
do not have to think about it. Yet how is it that you can immediately
and confidently give completely different interpretations to the same
two words? Or are they the same words?: and if not, how are their
differences established? Certainly not by sound or by appearance
on the printed page or lighted screen.
Let us look at a little different kind of sample, wherein the
change of one word requires completely different comprehension of
otherwise identical structures. Remember that "Partially similar
utterances made within very different situations are likely to require
different comprehendings."
I'm calling you a doctor.
I'm calling you a liar. 1 3
In almost any actual communication situation there would be
no misunderstanding of either statement. But the question I am asking
you to deal with is, how do you bring yourself immediately to the one
comprehension or the other, without the question of there heing a
need for a choice even crossing your mind?-unless it is forced
to cross your mind, as I am doing. In any given situation the meanings which you prohably gave to the two samples could be reversed.
If the situation were such that the person using the first statement
were accusing you of being a doctor, or categorizing you as one,
you would likely understand that that was his meaning. If the person
using the second one meant that you were in need of the services of
a liar, and that he was going to telephone for one, or send for one
(I am trying also to demonstrate various possible meanings that
"call" might have in either of the two main patterns of understanding) , you would understand his meaning.
The comprehension of such samples is easy: it is, as noted,
the explaining of how we do it that is hard. When the com pre13Will Pitkin asks his students
meanings of "His mother left him
with language are convinced that
language jokes, should have a lot
else they do with it.

in beginning linguistics to give the possible
a gibbering idiot." Most people who work
people, including students, should look for
of fun with language, along with whatever
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hension itself offers difficulties, getting at them can be an extremely
tortuous process. Ever since about our ninth year we have functioned
so easily and completely within our routine language situations that
we have no idea of the complexities we have mastered. Precisely
because we do function so easily most of the time, we often do not
know where to begin our attack on a non-routine language problem.
Comprehending is pulling it all together. We routinely do so at once
(or think we do ) ; when we can't do so all at once with a particular
utterance, written or spoken, we are at a loss about any part of it
until we have considered each part and the whole situation, for every
part influences every other part, and only after we have considered
all parts, from words to any larger language units, not to mention still
larger contexts, as I hope to show, can we finally pull it all together.
Suppose there is a single word that we do not understand. Very
often we pause on a word- and should pause more often, never
assuming that we know what a word means in any given occurrence.
When we do have to pause, we often turn to a dictionary for help.
Certainly that is one valid approach to a word, to capture it in a
dictionary, and examine it a'l it lies there tranquilized, clearly alive
and hreathing, hut inactive enough to let us turn it over at our leisure.
The dictionary maker, as hest he can, first tries to say what a
word means all hy itself :
La: the phenomenon of combustion as manifested
in light, flame, and heat and in heating, destroying and altering
effects

, fire

That seems clear-cut and satisfactory enough. But a good dictionary
maker cannot stop there. Into a collegiate-sized dictionary he may
put as many as forty or fifty such definitions of various possible meanings of tire. Then, if he is conscientious and has space enough, he
gives some examples of it in action , lets the tranquilizer wear off a
little. W ebster's Third Unabrid!!,ed ha<; three-fourths of a column
dealing with the word. The Oxford En!!,lish Dictionary examines it
through thirteen and a half columns.
The editors of the best dictionaries, in other words, believe that
they must give "utterances-within-situations" if the dictionary user is
to get a good heginning insight into words that he doesn't know or
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feels he doesn't know well enough. But even thirteen and a half
columns cannot give much experience compared to the total experiences we all have with words that we use or meet at all regularly. And
all of these experiences, as Richards has indicated, affect every different occurrence of the word that we experience, and each new
experience then affects each subsequent one: thus all language stays
alive, changing, developing, as we use it.
Let us look at that word "fire" a little more. It says something
all by itself, just as a word. It does not say what "water," just as a
word, says. We would almost never think of looking it up in a
dictionary - we have already had much, much more experience with
it than any dictionary could give us. 14
fire

Now let us release it from its tranquilized state into some simple
language contexts and see if we can then sneak up on it and catch
it in action:
Just after he had become convinced that he
would never be warm again, he had found not
only roof and walls, but a hearth containing a
most welcome fire.
It's on fire! Get the hose! I'll call the neighbors.
The officer raised his sword. The rifles were
leveled. The expected word came with only a
slight nervous pause: "Uh, fire!" The figure at
the wall jerked and slumped. It was over.
His attempted joking with the jury
missed fire , to the great detriment of his client.
His boss fire Joe? He wouldn't dare.
14There are of course certain utterances of " fire" that most of us would not
be able to interpret at once because we would not have experienced any pa rtially

similar utterances in partially similar situations and would have to go to a di ctionary to learn that fire can mean " to ring all the bells in a chime at once."
Or, try this for comprehension : "There is something to be done with the ball
when the wicket has fire in it."
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Obviously we could go on indefinitely, if not forever. The word
as repeated is spelled the same, would be pronounced the same (or
if there were any differences it would not be these that chiefly affected the meaning): in some sense, it clearly is the same word. 1 5
In another sense, they are not the same words; they communicate
different ideas as they are affected by (and as they in turn affect)
the contexts put around them. "Fire" even as meaning ordinary
combustion, we see, means something different depending on whether
the context shows that combustion to be a comfort or a threat. Thus
we can argue that every use of the word is a unique use: each word
used means something that never has been meant before, and never
will be meant again. Yet that unique meaning can come into being
only because of a word's meanings developed by previous use of it
in previous situations. And you think you are dealing with a code,
do you?
Will you keep in mind how you interpreted immediately and
with very different meanings "dead game," " I'm calling you a," and
"fire," as we proceed. What was going on around here as it happened?
For the tendency to think that we know, or can find out definitely
from a dictionary, what a word means in a given context, the assumption that a word keeps the same meaning from context to context, is,
as Richards demonstrates, one of the most persistent causes of misinterpretation. The reader must be ever alert to what this word
means in this context if he is to compose or to interpret well, whether
to be benefitted by beneficial expression or not harmed by faulty.
Now in some scientific and technical contexts, words can be
assigned comparatively definite, rather fixed meanings. Whenever we are dealing with things and actions that can be pointed to,
and when we for some reason really want to be as precise as possible,
we can regiment language to our purposes. There is little problem
interpreting such material:

15For the lecture the same transparency that put the shadow on the screen
which spelled out " fire" was left on continuously, and the contexts were put on
by overlays, thus allowing nominalists to consider whether or not it was the
same word.
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Methods

Dried brine shrimp cysts (gastrulae) were obtained and stored
at - 20°C. Development was initiated by hydration of the cysts
in Instant Ocean Sea Salts at 25°C. Approximately 24 hours were
needed for hatching at this temperature. The tolerance of early
nauplii to NaCI in the medium was measured as survival percentages in different salinities after 32 hours of incubation (Fig.
lA ) . Sodium and potassium ion levels were assayed by flame
photometry using a Beckman Model B Spectrophotometer. The
nauplii were prepared by rinsing with distilled water and drying
at 105°C for 24 hours. The dried nauplii were weighed and
dissolved in a l: l: 1 mixture of HN0 3 , H 2 0 2 , and H 2 0 at 95°C
for 40 min. Results are expressed as ,uEq of cations per mg of
naupliar dry weight. 16

That is, there is little problem for those who recognize the words and
other symbols; and for those who have participated in similar actions
and who have made and read similar utterances, there is hardly
ever any problem of misintepretation with such a statement competently composed.
But such things and actions, important as they can be to our
human purposes and achievements, are ultimately not nearly so important as other activities are. In fact such things and actions cannot
become important until we relate them, determine their significance,
in fact make them be important to us. And "determine their significance" is not an action we can point to; relationship, significance,
importance, are not things we can point to. Every time we see such
words, try to think of such ideas as these, we need to become very
alert to the difficulties of making our utterances and our interpretations.
Let us, then, look at a different level of utterance:
So why was Smith's discovery not plimmed in its day? Because
it was "proloshar." But is this really an explanation or is it
merely empty tautology? In other words, is there a way of providing
i 6 F . P . Conte, et aI., "Neck Organ of ATtemia salina Nauplii: a Larval
Salt Gland," p. 240.
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a criterion of the prolosharity of a discovery other than its failure
to make an impact? Yes, there is such a criterion. A discovery is
proloshar if its implications cannot be connected by a series of
simple logical steps to evantified knowledge.

Do you know what the utterance is talking about, can you Interpret it? No, you cannot. You could make an accurate syntactical
analysis, diagram the sentences, identify the parts of speech. But
you cannot yet know precisely what even the words that you do
recognize mean in this passage, because you do not know what some
other words mean. Yet this is very often our situation when we are
trying to develop ourselves, to increase our mental comprehension.
And such a situation is, or should be, the situation a student finds
himself in most of the time. If he is not, he is simply rehashing or
reviewing, not opening up his mind.
Now it would be unfamiliar material indeed that contained so
high a proportion of unrecognized words. But actually, a more important problem of interpretation is that we too often assume we
know what a word means just because we recognize it. You all knew
what "fire" meant when I first asked you to take note of the wordand you proceeded promptly to assign it a number of very different
meanings in different contexts. But what about more subtle differences
which are not always distinguished because the context does not
insist that we do so? There are often key words to the meaning of a
passage that are really, as Richards puts it, lock words that bar us
from the meaning until we adequately open up their possibilities. All
of you recognize, having seen and used them many, many times,
the words "canonical," "premature," and "appreciate." You have
experienced them more often than "tautology."l7
What I am requiring you to do at the moment is to treat the
three words as lock-or-key words by withholding them from you
momentarily. Let us, then, start pulling the passage together by
171 am not sure that I understand what "empty tautology" means in the
passage as accurately quoted below. Some valid definitions can be said to be
tautological, and if anyone is explaining what he means in "other words"
that really help us to understand, then the restatement is not empty. I do not see
that "premature" is a tautological explanation for "lack of appreciation ." But
am 1 appreciating the question Stent thought needed to be asked?
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translating "evantified" into "canonical" : the passage is talking about
canonical knowledge. And "plimmed" means "appreciated." So
Smith's discovery was not appreciated in its day hecause it could not
he easily and clearly connected to canonical knowledge. Now do we
know what is being talked about? Well, we still need to know that
"proloshar" means "premature." Smith's discovery was not appreciated because it was premature. And incidentally, it was not really
a person named Smith, which is just a convenient way of showing
it was a person- who can keep all those names straight, anyway.
Let us look at the original utterance, accurately quoted:
So why was Avery's discovery not appreciated in its day ?
Because it was "premature." But is this really an explanation or is
it merely empty tautology ? In other words, is there a way of providing a criterion of the prematurity of a discovery other than its
failure to make an impact? Yes, there is such a criterion: A discovery is premature if its implications cannot be connected by a
series of simple logical steps to canonical, or generally accepted .
knowledge. 1s
Now surely we can interpret the passage. Well, we can if we
know that the Avery whom Gunther H. Stent is talking ahout is
Oswald Avery, which means then that the discovery is the "identification of DNA as the active principle in hacterial transformation
and hence as genetic material."1O
And we do have to know, or learn in some way about such larger
contexts as this last to interpret such a passage adequately- which
means that all who really have followed the work of such men as
Avery are comprehending this passage much more fully than the
rest of us are, right this minute, even though we comprehend it,
presumably, about as well as those can who have no expertise in biochemistry.
But now wait a minute. What is "canonical" doing in a passage
talking of scientific knowledge? Well, depending on our previous
experiences of "utterances-with in-situations" we might not pay any
18Gunther S. Stent, " Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery,"
p. 84.
l°/bid.
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attention to the word, perCeIVing (or thinking that we perceive)
immediately what the writer means; or it might give us pause-and
apparently he thought it might give some readers pause, because he
throws in "generally accepted" to help point toward what he means
hy it.
But actually it is to some extent the word "appreciate" and to an
even greater extent the word "premature" that the reader must be
most careful not to misinterpret, and Stent alerts us to be particularly
careful of the latter by putting it in quotes. If we take care to understand what he means by it, we are able to interpret the passage (and
his whole article, which has as one major concern this question of
prematurity in scientific discovery). But if we start off thinking
that of course we know what "appreciate" and "premature" mean,
and assign to each of them immediately some one of their many
possible meanings (remember "fire"), then we are liable to a misinterpretation. Avery's work not appreciated? Nonsense. Everyone noted
it at the time and agreed that it was important. A genuine scientific
discovery premature? Nonsense. It was brilliant, it has been verified,
it had to come at that time or (after still other discoveries) Watson
and Crick probably wouldn't have been inspired to search out the
structure of DNA, which led to their discovery of the double helix;
Therefore, Avery'S work ohviously was not only not premature, it
came barely soon enough.
Such reactions are all too common as we read. 20 Those who
take care to understand what Stent is talking about may like or dislike, agree or disagree with his idea that Avery's discovery
was premature. But one has to interpret Stent's meaning to have any
of these responses to Stent's meaning, and the ahove "nonsense" responses are not dealing with what "appreciate" and ~'premature"
mean in Stent's passage.
As a significant part of Richards' practical investigations into
problems of interpretation, -he has had many, many students write
interpretations of written material for him over the years and has
2°lt is clear from the helps he offers the reader that Stent realized very
well the danger of his point being misunderstood. Unfortunately, not all writers
take pains to ward against misinterpretation, and readers still misinterpret no
matter how careful a writer may be.
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published some of the results. 21 To work through some of these exercises as he sets them forth is a sobering experience for anyone in
terms of his own interpretative abilities, and an overwhelming warning
system for teachers-and I do not mean just teachers of language
and literature. We all expect students to be able to interpret what we
have them read and what they hear from us, and we assume that
they do. But whenever we possibly can, we need to have them compose utterances-within-situations, and we need to interpret these
utterances carefully, so that we and they have some chance of seeing
whether they have in fact interpreted what we asked them to.
For particular kinds of information, and under pressures of some
necessarily large class sizes, we may have to do a lot of routine checking by asking students to write numbers or fill in blanks in response
to such items as the following:
The experiments by Conte and others measured the tolerance
of brine shrimps to (1 ) AgNO~ (2 ) NaCI (3 ) PO. (4 ) KCl
(5 ) None of the foregoing.

Yet we must be aware that such checking can give no assurance that
the student who knows the right answer because of attentive reading
(let alone the one who guesses it), understands the distin ction he is
being asked to make. The only reasonable assurance we have is that he
will come to understand it if he continues dealing with such situations,
and makes and receives utterances about them.
With a statement such as Stent's there is no way to get at whether
the reader has come to a valid interpretation or any guarantee that he
will develop his ability to interpret, if he simply checks off word
repetitions, identification of meaning by synonyms, or the like. A
reader may know very well that Stent called Avery's discovery premature, and may never come to doubt that he therefore understands
Stent's meaning (since he does "of course know" what "premature"
means) without in fact ever understanding it at all. That such misunderstandings do occur continually among intelligent and welleducated people, Richards has documented, as noted. 22 Once we
21Especially in Practical Criticism and Interpretation in T eaching.
22Edward R . Ducharme, in "The Evasion of the Text," and, according
to Richards (So Much Nearer, pp. 254-255 ), F. L. Lucas, in an article in
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move beyond things and actions that we can point to, move to significances, relationships, meanings, no matter what the field of knowledge
is, understanding can come only in language, "the supreme organ of
the mind's self-ordering growth."
So far, what I have tried to illustrate is that we can interpret
language only as we gra<;p an entire utterance, and grasp it entirely,
as is indicated etymologically in "comprehend." I hope that I have
provided convincing illustrations of how the immediate language context brings us to meaning, and we could spend much more time on
this: illustrate in detail how sound, syntax, the range of meanings
that each word has for us due to its previous uses (meanings denotative, connotative, relational, etymological . . . ) all must come together
if we are to interpret a text. But we must not forget that all utterances
are made within larger hum an situations, and that previous, present
and future human situations provide in all language situations innumerable influences that also affect the meaning and comprehension.
It is Richards' work with contexe 3 that perhaps more than
anything else sets him apart from most others who work in linguistics
and semantics. He keeps insisting on both the necessity and the difficulty of bearing in mind, in any working with comprehending language, whether composing or interpreting, all the influences in the
process, anything from the immediately surrounding words (as I have
tried to illustrate to this point), to the complete history of the utterer,
of the comprehender, and of the language being used. And although
completeness in any sense in regard to these latter is just plain impossiCam bridge University Studies, offer further evidence of the kind that Richards
gives.
23Richards uses " context" in Th e M eaning of M eaning, but says elsewhere
(S peculative In struments, p. 23n. ) that it apparently misled some readers. It
seems to me the best word still. In Interpretatio n in T eaching he suggests
" context" to mean "whatever meaning .
. [a word] has through belonging
to a recu rrent grou p of events.
." and "setting" to mean "the wo rds w hich
surround it in t he utteran ce, and the other contemporaneous signs which govern
its interpretation." (p. viii; see also S o Mu ch Ne arer, pp. 144-145. ) In any
event, he wishes to have us consider all of the influences at work in the whole
communication situation. In Speculative Instrum ents he tries nexus, and says
there that comprehending "is an instance of a nexus established through past
occurrences of partially .sim ilar utterances in partially similar situations-utterances and situations p artially co-varying." (pp. 23-24.)
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ble, we must always go as far as we can, or as far as the situation
justifies, for the extent to which this total context can be brought to
bear on the communication situation determines how much comprehension can be achieved.
Let me see now if I can illustrate in brief something of how
context in this larger sense can help determine interpretation of a text.
A Modest Proposal by Jonathan Swift is a straightforward essay
whose words and structure offer so little difficulty to an experienced
reader that he is likely to have no appreciation for the complexities
he has mastered as he moved to his understanding of it. The interesting question is, how does its actual and plain meaning emerge as being
almost entirely the exact opposite of what the words, as such, say?
There is no doubt in any reader's mind that the meaning of the words,
the immediate language utterance, can be understood only in a wider
human context. Even younger students, who are sometimes disturbed
when they first read this essay, know that further understanding is
called for. Even though the tone seems so neutral, the atmosphere so
bland, the development so reasonable, they never fail to puzzle over
what the author can possibly be up to, because he cannot be serious
about what he says-they know that. Yet only one who has grown
up in a society whose members never eat people-or do so only under
great stress-and who knows that Swift was not mad (at the time),
and that although he was a misanthrope he sought genuinely for the
welfare of his fellow man, can finally with confidence comprehend
that Swift was being savagely and bitterly ironic in proposing that the
poverty problems of Ireland be solved by the well-to-do paying poor
mothers for yearling children, who are to be slaughtered and eaten.
Only because people in our society cannot accept this proposal at the
literal word meaning, is everyone driven to a comprehending at some
other level, and the essay continues to give readers profound experiences with irony.
We may note by contrast the career of Daniel Defoe's The
Shortest Way With The Dissenters, written not many years before
Swift's proposal. Defoe's text advocated extreme measures against
all who would not worship in the Church of England, who wished to
establish their own independent chapels and congregations. Again,
what he really meant could only be determined by total context, and
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it took some time for this to prevail. Defoe assumed that his proposals
were so outrageous that they would cause people to think carefully
about what would really be proper treatment for dissenters. Actually,
a number of the extreme churchmen thought the suggestions were excellent, and a number of dissenters saw them as serious threats.
Unfortunately for Defoe, in the minds of a number of people it was
not impossible to pass and enforce a law in England at that time "that
whoever was found at a conventicle should be banished the nation,
and the preacher be hanged." When the more sensible leaders who
saw that it really was impossible pointed out this fact, the high Tories
were highly incensed that the low fellow had so taken them in, and
the government arrested him, fined him heavily, and sent him to the
pillory. Fortunately for Defoe, the more balanced among the dissenters
also by this time saw that what he had proposed was impossible, that
therefore he really was on their side, and they rallied round to make
sure that he didn't get stoned 2 4 while in the pillory. Thus at the
end of the affair, his roles had been reversed: he was a villain with the
Tories and a hero with the common people. But again, from only the
language itself, it had proved impossible to tell what was meant: only
the total context could do it.
Now, perhaps if we take seriously the term "total context," we
have by definition included everything of the language situation. But
in this total context of the language situation there is yet one more
specific aspect that I would like you to look at.
There is little difficulty these days in getting acknowledgment
that words are symbols: the word is not the thing or the action it
points to. Your eyes were neither dazzled nor smoke-filled, your skin
neither warmed nor burned by having the word "fire" brought into
your presence. But to say that a word is a symbol hardly gets us
started. In any given language utterance we must distinguish- I
hope you now agree-whether a given word (say "fire") means,
stands for, symbolizes, something as clear cut and identifiable, as
point-to-able, as physical coals in a stove or the process of, the changes
that are taking place in, a combustion; or whether there is an extension
24How does any reader know that what I mean here is not "experience the
effects of smoking marijuana or of drinking alcohol"?
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of meaning, whereby, say, the result formerly achieved by the placing
of a process of combustion against some highly combustible material
is now accomplished by pulling a trigger; or whether there is even
simply a designating of the word itself: a four-letter noun, or verb, or
adjective, or whether ... and so on.
As we come seriously to wrestle with language, we at times yearn
for a system that would give us clear-cut, definite meanings for words,
so that we could always say what we mean, and mean what we say.
Let "fire" mean the coals, or at most the coals and the process. In
particular, some say, let us not get fancy and talk of our hearts being
on fire or of lighting a fire under a committee slow to turn in a report.
The point again is that if we simplify we can develop a great deal
of precision in actions, observations, language. Consider the technical
report that water boils at 100° C. It does, does it? Not very often; it
doesn't. Life as we live it, experience as we have it, significance as we
achieve it, is not simple. It is well to know that water boils at 100°C,
but it is also well to remember that "as a matter of fact" it seldom
really does so. Without rigorous exclusion of non-water materials
nearly always associated with water as we find it- is laboratory
water more real than that in a mountain stream ?-without rigorous
control of atmospheric pressure, we cannot make water boil at precisely
"its" boiling point. Probably everyone who grew up in the mountains
has learned the difficulties of hard-boiling an egg at 10,000 feet.
And to achieve meaning, significance, a sense of relationship
in our most important, never simplified, always "impure" (in the sense
that all non-laboratory water is impure), cluttered-up experiencing,
we have to have expressions that embrace, seize together, "comprehend" a whole cluster of meanings "all at once" and "all together."
And the most important way that language accomplishes this is
metaphor.
Richards of course is not alone in noting metaphor in language
as both elemental and pervasive, operating in all language situations
except those from which it is deliberately and rigorously excluded
for particular purposes, the distilled laboratory language of the technical report, for example-and there are always dead and very often
living metaphors even there.
We tend to think of poets and people like that using figurative
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language, but no doubt most of you here have had called to your
attention the fact that we all use it continually. Metaphor is so much
a part of language, so much a part of thinking, that it becomes a real
question to find out-if we can even begin to--how much our
figurative way of expressing something determines how and what
we think as well as feel about it. All students of language feel a
close affinity with the person who said, "How do I know what I think
about the matter until I've heard what I have to say about it?" The
fact is that we do not know what we think-we do not know what we
feel-on most matters until we have worked through our expressions
about them, and those expressions seem just naturally to keep breaking
away from, or out of the restraints of, literalism, to have to do so, to
keep saying what we wish to say.25
Suppose that we are thinking about something. What metaphor
do we decide to use for the kind of thinking we are doing? Are we
pondering? Are we speculating? Are we ruminating? For most of
us most of the time these words are dead metaphors, but they still
carry over in connotation some sense of the original figure: and interestingly, we have again come up with the same figures in our modem
words. We ponder s0!l1ething, or we weigh the matter in our mind.
We speculate about something, or we take a look at it, not meaning
25For a sampling of Richards' dealing with metaphor, see Int erpretation
in T eaching, chapter 2. He of course deals with it continually in his discussions
of interpretation.
Susanne K . Langer postulates that "The spontaneous similes of language
are our first record of similarities perceived," that metaphor is therefore the law
of the life of language, "the force that makes it essentially relational," and
that only after language has developed its great practical applications can human
beings actually come to "believe that it was invented as a utility, and was
later embellished with metaphors for the sake of a cultural product called
poetry. " Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 141-142.
One can be continually brought up short by terms obviously technical that
on the face of them suggest fascinating metaphorical origins. I can see that I
have no business reading any social or literary extension into the word as Stent
uses it when he talks about the studies that led to the realization that "DNA
might not be a monotonous polymer after all;" but "the question of the reality
of the negative image," and "a pointwise-degenerate system of the form, " and
an "electron scavenger," and numerical values that are "sensitive to the choice"
(all samples from recent technical journals ) make an outsider think that metaphor is still very much at work in the creation of technical terms.
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with our literal eyes. We ruminate, or we chew on a problem for
awhile. Why do we go along a line of thought, but have an area of
study? Why not develop a volume or room of study, not just an area
or field? (Are these more open, with the third dimension taken for
granted?) When we say that one idea depends on another, the metaphor is dead, but we say in the words of our own language that a
series of ideas, all hang together, or that an outcome hangs on whether
something else happens.
Now the word "fire," we agreed earlier, does not mean what
the word "water" does. 26 And the word "lips" does not mean what
tHe word "rosebud" means, yet we have all experienced the use of the
word "rosebud" to mean someone's lips.
A. E. Housman ends one of his poems thus:
About the woodlands I will go
To see the cherry hung with snow.
The first of those two lines seems to be completely literal - at
least there would seem to be no reason to doubt that Housman,
or his implied speaker, the 20-year-old lad, did intend to go about the
woodlands whenever the general situation of the poem did recur.
But in the second line "cherry" means "whatever cherry trees are
there," or something of the sort, and "snow" means cherry blossoms,
while still carrying some of the meanings of snow: its beauty, perhaps
its coldness, certainly the fact that it comes seasonally and does not last.
And "hung" is both literal and suggestive: cherry blossoms and snow
do hang from branches, though they also stay on top of them: and
of course "to hang" also means "to decorate."
What all users of language do with shiftings, overtones, and
ambiguities such as these is to blend a whole complexity of experiences
-seeing, feeling, and whatever else we call experience-into a
response that we would not have except for this human genius within
all of us that lets us both blend experiences and respond to words
all at once in many ways, in a flash, or in something less than a flash.
26Carlton Culmsee likes to see how prospective teachers react to a bit of
advice: If you detect a spark of genius in a student, he tells them, by all
means water it.
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Therefore, a., a final specific set of exercises, in my attempt to
show you something of what I think I. A. Richards means by identifying language as "the supreme organ of the mind's self-ordering
growth," consider with me the sense that I suspect all of us here have,
that we as individuals are inevitably at the center of our psychological
and physiological universe. The universe, for each of us, starts with us
and stretches out forever in all directions away from our sensory and
mental focus, and we therefore find ourselves responding to expressions that communicate and enlarge this sense of being at the center
of all that we know.
Now, I do not say that we are inevitably, or from every viewpoint,
at the center of this universe. We may even accept the findings that
our solar system is toward an edge of our galaxy, for example. But
our culture and the individuals in it generally see man as at the center:
some ohjects, we say (do not we have to do so?) are so many light
years away, and are receding; or, angels and heaven are above us,
heasts and insects and hell below us; or, the complete cosmos is
grander, more largely organized than we, the amoeba and mineral
existence are less developed, less fully organized. Some such organizing
overviews of all experience seem essential to us; apparently we cannot
function as humans (hecome human?) without some such. Our
particular view of ourselves as heing in the middle, however, should
not he considered as even psychologically inevitable. It may be that
the sense of having "some position" in the scheme of things (some
sense of there being a scheme of things) is inevitable for the mind
that can be called human. But it would appear that at least an individual here and there has, for example, viewed himself as the lowest
entity on the universal totem pole, and another has seen himself as
the apex of all that is.
To come up with the idea that man "has a position," let alone
the idea that he is somewhere in the middle, would be impossible,
of course, without language. To deal with such an idea adequately
makes the greatest demands pos..,ible on both our expressive and interpretive powers. Simply to mention many of the possibilities shows
off a great deal of language in action. Is man "the heart of the universe," or is he "caught in the middle of things"? Is his life an ordeal
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or an opportunity, or both, or something in between? Whichever
it is, is it a time interlude in an eternal existence, a preparation for a
new existence, or a brief consciousness between endlessly back and
endlessly forward projecting situations of individual non-awareness?
How much have you heard and read of such possibilities? How
much more do you hear and read and think and react within a
context of the unspecifically-thought-of assumption that such is your
situation? Yet we cannot hegin to deal with such speculations,
ideas, sensings, without language.
And language cannot begin to deal with them without metaphor.
We cannot get single-word, pinned-down technical expressions for
such encompassing experiences.
Let me try to give point to this assertion by having you look at
just three or four excerpt'> from as many attempts to give expression
to this general idea, of the many, m any that we have in our Western
culture. At the same time, of course, we will be dealing still with
the total context of these utterances within situations. See if you ran
watch what is happening, as I asked you to watch what happened with
"fire."
How is man in the middle of things? Consider how the counsellor
of King Edwin expressed it, when the court were asking themselves
whether this newly learned of Christianity could give them some
help on the problem.
I have observed, my King, that this present life of man on
earth, in comparison to the time that is unknown, is as though
you were sitting at a banquet with your chieftains and retainers
in the wintertime, when the fire is kindled and the hall warmed,
and it is raining and snowing and storming outside; and a sparrow
comes in through one door, and departs out another. Behold,
during the time that he is inside, he is not smitten by the storm of
winter. But, it is merely the twinkling of an eye and the least
space that he is out of the winter before he goes back into it.
Man's life is also thus, and what comes before, or what comes after,
we do not know.
The comparison reaches us still, over a millenium of years,27
27Tautological, or does it add meaning because we now think of a millenium
as one unit of time, not a thousand years?
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long after the mead halls have fallen, and glass panes keep sparrows
from flying toward our fires. Whatever we believe about the times that
have come before or shall come after, these times on occa~ion look
cold and alien to us.
How is man in the middle of things? In the duality that is
his particular situation and problem. If he were pure spirit or pure
mind, he would not be troubled with sensuality; if he were only
sensual, he could not have any concern about being sensual.
Goethe's Faust, having developed as far as any person might
reasonably be expected to, still feels unfulfilled and would willingly
give allegiance to any system that could prove ahle to fulfill himand he concludes such a bargain with the devil. Mephistopheles
offers Faust any experiences he wants, and Faust tries a lot of them,
but Mephistopheles, being wholly~ S a devil, cannot understand the
half-risen, in-between position of the human being. Faust likes a party,
hut he can't fulfill himself only by partying. Faust wants sex, but
finds himself also in love. Faust fulfills himself finally by service to
others, a path he had to find for himself, since it never would have
occurred to Mephistopheles to "tempt" him in that direction,
Mephistopheles having nothing in his nature to incline himself that
way.
At one point Mephistopheles, impatient with this human dimension that he simply cannot understand, sneeringly refers to Faust as a
"transcendental sensualist."~D Goethe's whole play actually is a
metaphor of man in that particular situation, and in such a context,
this phrase is a brilliant language achievement. It says in two words
what the whole play is saying, yet those two words could not say
what they do say if their meaning were not established by the total
play- and by the total context provided by Goethe's and his
readers' sense of man being in the middle of things. Just as only the
context could determine which meaning we give to "fire," and what
Swift meant by advocating that his contemporaries eat the children
2SMight one say he is purely a devil, or a pure devil?
~niib e rsinnlicher sinnlicher Freier.
"Transcendental sensualist" is C. F.
Macintyre's translation, and it seems to me a much more apt term than the
usual more literal "super-sensual, sensual wooer," or some variation.
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of the poor, so only by knowing the context in as large a sense as we
can, are we able to understand what Goethe means by "transcendental
sensualist. "
How is man in the middle of things? In Eugene O 'Neill's
The Hairy Ape, Yank, having lost his innocent sense of "belonging,"
at which time he was not concerned about where his posItIOn was
in the scheme of things, knowing only that he did "belong," is
finally driven to say:
I ain't on oith and I ain't in heaven, get me ? I'm in de middle
tryin' to separate 'em, takin' all de woist punches from bot' of 'em.
Maybe dat's what dey call hell, huh? But [to an ape in a zoo]
you, yuh're at de bottom. You belong! Sure! Yuh're de on'y one
in de woild dat does, yuh lucky stiff!
Though the language is deliberately unpoetic, the impact in the total
play is great. We watch this limited human being-limited if in no
other way in his opportunities to know anything of other men's
wrestlings with the problem-lose his unreflective sense of belonging
and have to try to search out his place in the universe. In that contexeo his expression of where he stands, his envy of the beast's uncomplicated position, as he sees it, at the bottom of things, his novel
positioning of hell as being between earth and heaven, are all very
meaningful to us. Because we see him working out his expression,
because we join him in his context, we can interpret what he means,
and can experience with him.
Let 'us look at a little longer excerpt- and are you seeing how
all of our previous ideas help provide context for any partially similar
utterances?
30In that context. One reason it is difficult to do justice to any piece of
literature by talking about it is that such activity by itself has insufficient context. In the classroom, of course, every effort is made to have each student read
the work before there is any discussion of it (and ideally he will read it
again-and some works again and again-after any discussion, critique,
analysis, what you will). One invited to talk about literature in some way, to a
group whose common literary experiences cannot be identified, is tempted to
say, Do not come hear me philosophize about literature-stay home and read
something I have read, go see a play that I have seen, write about something
meaningful to you and let me read it. Th en we can have a meaningful discussion.
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Plac'd O'n this isthmus O'f a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With tO'O' much knO'wledge fO'r the sceptic side,
With tO'O' much weakness fO'r the StO'ic's pride,
He hangs between; in dO'ubt to' act, O'r rest ;
In dO'ubt to' deem himself a gO'd, O'r beast ;
In dO'ubt his mind O'r bO'dy to' prefer ;
BO'rn but to' die, and reas'ning but to' err;
Alike in ignO'rance, his reasO'n such,
Whether he thinks tO'O' little, O'r tO'O' much:
ChaO's O'f thO'ught and passion, all cO'nfus'd;
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd ;
Created half to' rise, and half to' fall,
Great 100rd O'f all things, yet a prey to' all;
SO'le judge O'f truth, in endless errO'r hurl'd:
The glO'ry, jest, and riddle O'f the wO'rld!31
There is nO' ward here that anyane in this audience daes nat
recagnize. With what I have tried to' show abaut context and metaphar, dO' yau see what alert attentian nevertheless wauld have to' be
given by a reader whO' wauld camprehend the passage as fully as
he can?
Haw much cantext dO' yau bring to' the basic figure of the isthmus, and what is in the masses that yau put an either side af that
isthmus? Same sart af masses have to' be there far the ward "isthmus"
to' exist, to' have its meaning- what masses dO' yau put there far
the ward to' develap its meaning far yau in this text? What dO'
" darkly" and "wise" data each ather recipracally in such a juxtapositian? The metaphar that talks af-equates?32-intelligence and wisdam in terms af- with- light, and af ignarance and ather mental
31Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, "Epistle II," II. 3-18.
32Does a metaphor equate something with something else? I believe we
might try saying it does if we look at the range of meanings we give to the
idea of "equal." Note just a very few samples:
In "Sixteen ounces equal one pound," the word means "is the same as"
or "add up to" or "is another way of designating. " What does it mean in,
"The planted acreage was equal to last year's" or "He was equal to the occasion,"
or "All men are created equal"?
The relationships of ideas in metaphors, those expressions that equate, or
make equal, or make parallel, or blend in thought or feeling or attitude, or whatever it is they do, are indeed fundam ental in all language development and use.
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deficiencies in terms of darkness is one of the pervasive ones of our
culture}3 Does "rudely" here mean "impolitely," and if not, what
partially similar utterances and partially similar experiences do you
have that would let you approach the meaning in this text? What
different kinds of relationships are generated between these various opposing terms? How, for example, is the relationship between thinking
too much and thinking too little, different from the relationship of
abused and disabused, or-of between being a lord of all and a prey to
all? What about the whole pattern of many kinds of opposition all
affecting each individually stated opposition? What about the final
triplet: the juxtaposition of "glory" and "jest" makes for a riddlebut do not all the previous lines as well as these two words give a
meaning to "riddle" here that it could never have without all of them?
Not such questions but the responses implied by such questions
and innumerable others are involved in the comprehending. And with
a passage of this complexity-and it is of course a straightforward
passage, comparatively-a great many language and experience resources are needed to re-establish its potential. 34 A high-school or freshman student might be taxed simply to get the plain sense. Any of us
might open up new insights on any careful re-reading.
Interpreting anything that provides a developing, an opening
up of the mind, says Richards, requires attentiveness, "vigilance,"35it cannot be done mechanically, routinely, slackly. But vigilance is
not enough if we do not know how to get started on a problem of
interpretation.
The prime obstacle in general education is a feeling of helplessness before the unintelligible. Every problem is new to the mind
which first meets it and it is baffling until he can recognize in it
something which he has met and dealt with already. The all important difference between the mind which can clear itself by
33For a mention of several such important and pervasive ways of looking
at things and of how critical they might be in translation, see Richards,
Speculative Instruments, pp. 33-34.
34Richards offers as a tentative definition of the valid reception of an
utterance as being a reincarnation to "more or less the same potentialities" as it
had when it was uttered. So Much Nearer, pp. 166-167.
35See Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, chapters 22,25,32.
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thought and the mind which remains bewildered and can proceed
only by burying the difficulty in a formula-retained, at best,
by mere rote memory-is in this power to recognize the new
problem as in part, an old conquest. Language, with its inexhaustible
duplications (which here are duplicities), ceaselessly presents to
us the old as though it were new, familiar ideas in novel disguises,
understood distinctions as fresh opportunities for confusion, already
assimilated combinations as unforeseeable conjunctions. The
teacher meets with all this whenever he reads anything which
stretches his intelligence; the pupil meets with it all the time, and
if he is being well taught he should be expecting it and enjoying
the sense of increasing power that his progressive mastery of it can
afford. For this growth in power is, fundamentally, the vitalizing
incentive with which education builds.
The beginner, in studying the most elementary matters, is
doing nothing which is (or should be ) for him any simpler than
what we are doing when we try to follow a new and difficult
author. And we can only help him in a fashion parallel to that
in which we ourselves would wish to be helped or to help ourselves:
that is, not by supplying the 'right answer' to the difficulty (with
some unexamined criterion of 'right answers' ) but by making
clearer what the difficulty itself was, so that when we meet it again
we shall not have to 'remember the answer' but shall see what it
must be from our understanding of the question. A learner at all
stage learns-for serious purposes- only in so far as he is a
thinker, and the difficulties of thinking are never new. We overcome them- in elementary mechanics, and in the Theory of
Relativity, in learning to read words of one syllable and in reading
Ulysses, alike-by taking account of them, by seeing what we are
doing and setting aside other things which we should not be trying
to do there. We solve them finally by discovering how much more
simple the task was than we had hitherto supposed. 36
Composing utterances, whether written or spoken-that is,
utterances of the sort we are dealing with here, not our routine social
responses- is at least as difficult as interpreting, and is solvable in
essentially the same way, and only in that way: by thinking through
each new problem of expression as it occurs. Composing is not learned
once for all, like riding a bicycle- and we might note that even an
experienced cyclist rides to a fall now and again. It is not a matter
3GRi chards, Interpretation in T eaching, p. 4.
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of "finding" words that "fit" a meaning already achieved in some
way, for «what is said depends on how it is said, and how it is said on
what is said. W hat we say and how we say it are inseparable- in
utterances which are entire."31 The most significant kind of meaning
must find "itself in its words by finding the words for itself."3' In the
process, "the arrival ofa word and of a meaning may he indistinguishably welcome, or a proffered word because of an accompanying meaning is just as instantaneously dismissed." 39 Sometimes in this struggle
toward meaning the writer achieves a statement that so clearly shows
him what he has been groping toward and for, that everything
written to that point must he extensively reorganized, or even discarded and a "radical restart" undertaken. 40
I have tried in this discussion, by looking at some comparatively
simple and straightforward examples of language in action, to open
up our perception of some of its complexities. I can only hope that
they were simple enough to let you actually catch a glimpse of your
own language in action within you, and not so simple that you were
not impressed by what you were able to do: I hope indeed that you
marvelled and continue to marvel at the tremendous feats you accomplish so easily. There is nothing else quite like language in action, in
the universe as we know it.
With language which is actually in use among its users, doing
its continuing work for them, we students and teachers of language,
of course, are no more and no less involved than anyone else is,
no closer to our language and no farther away. We too have our
definite things and actions we can point to, and those of you in other
fields no more than we can come to your most significant meanings
apart from, away from, your language. 41
31Richards, So Mu ch Nearer, p. In.
3sIbid. He is talking 'here specifically of poetry, but the process is essentially the same for all composition that deals with anything beyond that which
we can point to. His statement about butterflies and nets, p. 3, above, is another
way of making the same point.
39Ibid., p. 137.
4°Ibid., p. 165. See also Interpretation in Teaching, pp. 275-277, which
discusses these problems in relation to doctrines of usage which would limit
expression .
41Though you may of course depend on other symbol systems also.
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When any experience can be quantified, when any obsezvation
can be sufficiently simplified or controIIed so that the focus can be kept
on one thing at a time, however complicated the sequences and total
patterns, then symbol systems more "pure," more manageable than
language can operate very effectively.
When we move from obsezvation, direct sensation, to relationships, meanings, interpretations, comprehensions, no one can go far
in any field without language: "Words are the meeting points at
which regions of experience which can never combine in sensation
or intuition come together."42
If people in the humanities have any advantage in this matterand I am not sure they do, though one would think their situation
ought to give them some- it is that they know that in language is
their meaning, that language is where whatever they are or have or
do, is. That is why, whatever else we do, we believe that we must
continue to give close attention to interpreting the text--that is what
we have to work with. Others, it seems to us, sometimes think they,
in contrast, are working with real things, rather than merely verbalizing: and they therefore either function unselfconsciously in their
language situations-which functioning is all to the good so long
as it works, which is most of the time in our routine situations, even
when our routine situations are highly specialized and complex- or
when they do experience a problem, think that it is lack of a skill
in something separable and that by seeking out a coach or someone
to hold them upright while they point and pedal, they can restore their
feel for riding their bicycle of language which they seem to have lost
for the moment, though they of course know perfectly well what
it is they want to put down for the record, if they can just find the
words that will fit whatever it is that they already know.
If it is a riddle how he functions with it, man's language is no
jesting matter, but an essential source of whatever glory he has.
There is not something wrong but something right with man that he
cannot reduce himself, his experiences, his meanings, his significances,
to that which can be symbolized in a binary number system. Language
is his means of developing his human responses:
4~SO Much N earer, p. 171, Ri chards quoting a passage he had written
ea rlier in Phiiosolill), of Rhetoric.
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Bad taste and crude responses are not mere flaws in an otherwise
admirable person. They are actually a root evil from which other
defects follow. No life can be excellent in which the elementary responses are disorganized and confused. 43
An improvement of response is the only benefit which anyone can
receive, and the degradation, the lowering of a response, is the only
calamity.44

Developing one's language is not a quick, easy, or simple process,
though the extent of the young child's miraculous first mastery sometimes causes us to take further development for granted. Our language
must grow if the rest of us is to continue to do so, and the process
is neither easy, automatic, nor rapid. "An original poem, as much as a
new branch of mathematics, compels the mind which receives it to
grow, and this takes time."45
It may be true that there are those "who, having never been
troubled by thought, have never found any difficulty in expressing
it,"4G but we need to understand for ourselves, and to help our
students to see for themselves, that to have trouble with an expression may well indicate that we really are thinking newly, instead of
merely reviewing.
Whenever difficulties arise in a real language situation, so close
is language to us that we tend to take the whole matter personally, and
say either that there is something wrong with us, as some students,
unfortunately, tend to do after a little unsuccessful wrestling with a
new comprehending, or that there is something wrong- useless,
uninteresting, etc.-with the utterance, or the utterer; or we otherwise slide away from the difficulties. Even when we wholeheartedly
accept the challenge, it seems as if the learning difficulties are with
the material, or the vocabulary (in the sense of simply learning new
word lists) or with our lack of previous experience; and human
development may be concerned with all of these. But always, as a
total process, the concern finally must be with the development of
43Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 62.

44Ibid., p. 237.
45Ibid., p. 29l.
46Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, p. 242.
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ourselves and our control of our thought, through the development
within us of our language.
Regarding metaphor, and its overwhelming importance in its
influence on how we look at things, it will be important over the next
several years, if not forever, to particularly cherish our organic, growth
metaphors: to continue to have branches of learning and not just
compartments of knowledge; to get at the root of a matter, not just
down to the nitty-gritty; to create new insights, and not just take a
look at what it all adds up to; to nourish the mind so it will grow,
and not just program it so it will retrieve.
No matter how one defines man, as rational animal or child of
God, as a little superior to the beasts or a little lower than the angels,
he to an extent still unplumbed by any of us and undreamed-of by
most of us, is what his language has made of him and what he has
made of his language. His speech createth as well as betrayeth him.
Language in action takes us right down into whatever it is we
are, where we both lose ourselves and meet ourselves coming around
every corner we try to tum. It is not, finally, anything separable from
us. Language is not a code: it is an organ- the supreme organ of
the mind's self-ordering growth.
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